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THE CRY FOR LAW REFORM
By Robert C. Smith.
Are we too much dominated by phrases? I am satisfied thai
both in argument and in judgment a very considerable amount
of bad law goes unchallenged because it is couched in very pre-
sentable English. The influence of phrases in political campaigns
is, of course, well known. Lord Beaconsfield carried an election
by the words "peace with honor." Wonderful deeds of valor
did the Highland clans perform when inspired by the "slogan"
or rallying battle-cry! What two words could make a more cap-
tivating union than "law" and "reform," uniting the saving prin-
ciple of civilization with the spirit of modern progress? Who
could be opposed to it? Of course, we are all in favor of law
reform. It must mean something very desirable. We shall not
dream of saying of it as some of the old Tory peers did of the
English Reform bill, that "it comes neither recommended by the
weight of ancient authority, nor by the spirit of modern refine-
ment." I hope I may not be classed as an opponent of law reform
if I venture to ask for anything so matter of fact as a definition of
its purview or purpose. Is it intended to reform the whole body of
substantive law? Neither language nor law was a general pre-
concerted scheme to provide for future social needs. They both
followed, not preceded, the social evolution. I have not heard it
suggested that there shall now be undertaken a general revision of
all branches of the law. Advanced socialism would probably be
alone in advocating this. Individual ownership, rights of con-
tract, the order of succession, freedom of willing and other funda-
mental portions of the law probably represent what the immense
majority of our people believe to be right in principle. Law
cannot be crystalized into any form that will forever meet all the
requirements of progressive society. As necessities arise, they
must be intelligently dealt with, and they will be much more
effectually dealt with, as they are felt to exist, than theoretically as
part of a general system of reformation.
As co-operation in the way of incorporation became so striking
a feature of commercial and industrial activity, the great body of
law specially applicable to joint stock companies gradually grew
up with the development which made it necessary. When some
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more convenient and efficacious way of doing things is discovered,
it is first proved and then adopted; and so the Torrens and other
systems of registration became law, superseding earlier and cruder
systems. The desirability of uniformity, particularly in commer-
cial law, is obvious, and the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, by profound research and patient work, have accomplished
and are accomplishing splendid results. So may we look for gen-
eral advancement. But how many of those who join in the cry
for "Law Reform" have any definite idea of what they are advo-
cating? A living and active community will, of necessity, al-
ways need new laws and amendment of old ones, and it can
scarcely be said that on this continent we are deficient in the nec-
essary amount of variety of legislative authority for the purpose.
When the demand for law reform assumes a concrete shape at
all, it is generally with regard to.procedure, i.e., the machinery and
methods of giving effect to the law, and the reforms principally
called for relate to expedition and economy. Professor Goldwin
Smith is credited with saying, "You might as well expect the
tigers to clear the jungle of their hiding places, as expect law re-
form from the lawyers." This, no doubt, merits an angry growl,
but the professor would probably not hear it. Unless it is pro-
posed to discard all that the experience of ages has taught, and to
begin experimenting over again, reform in procedure must nec-
essarily come from the lawyers. We would not expect the land
surveyors to define good practice in applied electricity, nor in-
vite the clergy to revise the rules of the stock exchange. We are
all agreed that it is most desirable that a cause should be decided
as soon as possible after it is instituted. Tardy justice is, in many
cases, no justice at all. But before suggesting reforms let us
determine definitely the reason why there are such arrears in
many courts. The ordinary delays in pleading and procedure are
not a serious matter, but the business of the courts is frequently
far in arrears. My belief is that one reason, if not the main rea-
son, is of the simplest possible kind. The public expect the judges
to do more than they reasonably can do. It is quite reasonable to
lay down any rule as to the number of cases which ought to be
heard and decided within any given time, nor can anyone but the
judge himself determine how long he should deliberate upon any
given case. If a judge be worthy to administer justice at all, may
he not be trusted to devote his own time conscientiously to the
public service, and to press forward the business of the court in
which he presides, as rapidly as is consistent with safety? There
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should be no cheese-paring in connection with the administration
of justice. The courts should have enough divisions and enough
judges to efficiently discharge the business coming before them,
and until this, at least, is assured, there can be no satisfactory
reform. It may be said that the judges are not complaining of
overwork. But their position is naturally a delicate one, just as
it is with regard to their salaries. Why does not some reformer
investigate the subject of judicial salaries? He would find that
they are fixed upon a hopelessly inadequate scale. In Canada, a
few years ago, there was a general increase, but it was altogether
insufficient. Judicial salaries were, in many cases, fixed long ago,
when the cost of living was much less and the various govern-
ments in a much poorer condition to pay salaries. It is a very
striking anomaly that those who are performing the highest and
most important duties in the state, should, as a rule, be so miser-
ably remunerated. That, of course, has no relation to the other
question, whether enough judges have been supplied efficiently
to discharge the business of the courts.
Another prolific cause of delays is the number of appellate
courts, and the facility with which appeals are taken. The whole
question of appeals is beset with difficulties. The appellate sys-
tem naturally reposes on the postulate that the judgment of the
court of final resort is always right. To the Supreme Court of
the United States, and to the House of Lords in England, we
must attribute infallibility. The whole fabric is founded on that
idea. And the same is true of other courts whose jurisdiction is
final. The right of appeal is a very important one and not lightly
or hastily to be surrendered. The court of first instance is more
careful because it exists. I am not familiar enough with the pro-
cedure in many of the states, as to appeals, to write on the sub-
ject generally, but I believe it worth inquiry whether some of the
intermediate appeals might not with advantage be dispensed with,
and the delay in the hearing, from whatever cause it arises, be
materially shortened, even if Appellate Divisions have here and
there to be duplicated to overtake the work. Reform in the mat-
ter of delay is a necessity, and will never be obtained without the
earnest co-operation of Bench and Bar. It is, however, quite
evident that it can be obtained.
Upon the other reform, viz., the making of resort to the courts
less expensive, I do not feel so sure that it can be accomplished;
at least, in the manner and to the extent that would place the rich
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and poor on level terms in litigation. The duties and fees payable
to Government ought to be reduced to a minimum. The adminis-
tration of justice is not to be run as a commercial enterprise, with
a view to making receipts and disbursements at least equal. But
even when this has been done, we are not much advanced toward
our reform. The Government's share of bills of costs is not a
very large one. Counsel fees are by far the larger portion of
every bill of costs. We are often told in our profession that we
must not remove the ancient land-mark, that we must resist the
irmovations of commercialism; and that we must maintain and
cherish the high ideals which originally established the honor of
the Bar. Very true, and I range myself on the side of the con-
servative forces. I like to feel that counsel are officers of the
court; that it is their duty to see that no injustice prevails, etc.,
etc. Nothing can ever be effectively done, however, without real-
izing and taking account of actually existing conditions. The
brutal facts are that the profession of the law is carried on, among
other things, for profit; that those who attain skill and distinction
in it expect to be paid higlher fees than those who do not; that it
is. a great advantage fQr a litigant to be represented by able
counsel, and that the poor litigant is at a manifest disadvantage in
this respect. In some of the older countries I understand that
the legal profession is recruited from those who neither expect nor
desire to make money in it. It is looked upon more as a vocation
of honor than emolument. An experience I had a short time ago
rather supports this. I required to obtain an opinion in Germany
upon a matter ;nvolving over $iooooo. I received the opinion
from a Doctor of Laws, of high standing, and a memorandum
of charges composed of two items: "Conference with your agent"
and "My opinion upon the question," the total charges being
twenty-four marks, or in United States currency, $6.oo. I do not
know why this simple little bill should have caused such an awak-
ening of conscience, or why I should suddenly have felt such a
weight of accumulated guilt. I could only obtain relief by think-
ing of all my very dear learned friends -of New York. Even if
true, as the Scripture saith: "Though hand join in hand, the
wicked shall not go unpunished," I gathered a vast amount of
illogical .and unscriptural comfort from the reflection that my
fees had been a not very dark grey-something between the
angelic whiteness of German leniency and the "blackness and
darkness and thick smoke" of the American metropolis.
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There is unquestionably an advantage in being able to retain
leading counsel. How this can be obviated, it is difficult to see.
It would not be practicable to have a State advocate in every
court to oversee trials and equalize the benefit of counsel, so to
speak. The advantage which the affluent enjoy as regards coun-
sel, though, is much more than offset by the slight penchant of the
Bench and the all-devouring prejudices of the jury, against cor-
porations, and the representatives of money influence generally.
Quite apart from the popular cry for law reform, which is
neither prompted by definite knowledge nor controlled by apprecia-
tion of the difficulties in the way, there is the earnlest desire in the
profession itself that anomalies should be removed, and that the
administration of justice should at least keep pace with the en-
lightenment and progress of the times. I believe the weight 
of
opinion in the profession is that any systematic revision of the sub-
stantive law with a view to its reformation is undesirable and
practically impossible, but that there is a wide field for reform 
in
procedure, in the direction of simplicity and despatch and to 
some
extent, economy. That procedure should be simplified require- 
no
argument. The fullest powers of summary amendment should 
be
vested in the courts, provided that no suitor should thereby 
be
taken by surprise. That it should be possible for any cause to 
be
disposed of upon technical grounds, without its merits 
having
been determined, is a serious reflection upon otir whole legal sys-
tem. Delays must be shortened and costs reduced as far as 
possi-
ble. Let the subject, however, be approached with some sense 
of
responsibility. One may not set any limit to discovery and inven-
tion in the natural sciences, but it is quite safe to predict 
that
justice can never be administered by any penny-in-the-slot device.
Neither in the wisdom of the ancients nor in all the ingenious
novelties of to-day, do we find any substitute suggested for the
exercise of judgment by skilled and disciplined intellects in order
to define rights according to fixed rules of law.
Robert C. Smith.
THE PSEUDO-DOCTRINE
THE PSEUDO-DOCTRINE OF THE EXCLUSIVE-
NESS OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS
TO REGULATE COMMERCE
By Frederick H. Cooke, of the New York Bar.
If there be any virtue in frequent reiteration of statement, there
would seem to be, in the whole realm of our constitutional law, no
more firmly established doctrine than that of the exclusiveness of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce within the scope of
the commerce clause of the Federal constitution. It was long ago
declared by Mr. Justice Story to have been "settled, upon the
most solemn deliberation, that the power is exclusive in the gov-
ernment of the United States." 1 A few of the more recent in-
stances of its recognition by the Supreme Court will here suffice.
"It has been too frequently decided by this court to require the
restatement of the decisions, that the exclusive power to regu-
late interstate commerce is vested by the constitution in Con-
gress.'"2 "Any exercise of State authority, in whatever form man-
ifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repug-
nant to the commerce clause." 2 "It has been frequently decided
in this court that the right to regulate interstate commerce is, by
virtue of the Federal constitution, exclusively vested in the Con-
"gress of the United States. . . The exclusive power in Con-
gress to regulate such commerce (has been) uniformly main-
tained." 4
We are not here specially concerned with the important qualifi-
cation of the doctrine, based on the alleged distinction between
"matters national" and "matters of local interest," 5 it being seem-
' Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1o67. But this statement was
made on the supposed authority of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., , 209
(x824), where, however, the point, though incidentally touched upon, was
not in reality involved.
2 New Me.ico ex rel. McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 2o3
U. S., 38 (igo6).
3 Atlantic Coast Line v. Whaton, 207 U. S., 328 (1907); Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S., 218 (1909).
4 Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S., 524 (1go).
5 This is the distinction first prominently asserted in Cooley z. Port
Wardens, 12 How., 299, 319 (Dec. T., x85i).
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ingly established that, as to the latter class of cases, the power of
Congress is not exclusive, but concurrent with that of the States.
We venture, however, to suggest, without elaborating the point,
that the very existence of this qualification tends to cast suspicion
upon the general doctrine, especially as "the court has never, in
fact, formulated any general principles by which to determine
what subjects are in a local and what in a national class." a
It may also serve to cast suspicion upon the doctrine, that it is
confined in its scope to the exclusion of State legislation merely,
the application of common law rules (whether in the Federal or
in the State courts) not being precluded.7 This distinction seems
very artificial and arbitrary, in some, at least, of its applications,
as irr case of rules regulating the liability of carriers. Take, for
instance, a statute merely declaratory of the common law. Re-
garding the rule declared as merely statutory, it would seem inap-
plicable to commerce within the scope of the commerce clause;
regarding it as a common lav rule, it would be applicable.
8 Yet
in both instances the practical effect seems precisely the same.
But we are not here specially concerned with the question of the
validity of the doctrine of the exclusiveness of the power of Con-
gress, though, in passing, we submit that; from the standpoint of
sound constitutional construction, the contrary view, that Con-
gress and the States have general concurrent power in this respect,
is the true one.9 What we do propose to show is that, even
judged by the decisions of the Supreme Court itself, this supposed
doctrine has, apart from anomalous cases that will be considered,
nothing more than a nominal existence; that it is an empty form
of words, a pseudo-doctrine, a myth, an illusion, an unreality, a
superstition, if you please. We also propose to show that this is
not a merely academic theoretical conclusion, but that mischievous
consequences of great practical importance have resulted from the
countenance given this pseudo-doctrine.
6 See article on. The Exclusiveness of the Power of Congress, &c., by
J. S. Rogers, in 53 Am. Law Reg., 0. S., 529, 546 (i9o5).
7 The existence of this distinction seems to have been established in
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., i8i N. S., 92 (i9oi).
s That it would be given the same effect, may be suggested by Tele-
graph Co. v. Mellon, Ioo Tenn., 429 (1898).
9 See what seems to us to be the unanswerable reasoning of Taney,
C. J., in the License Cases, 5 How., 5o4, 579 (Jan. T., 1847). There are
other early decisions in which the point was much discussed. See argu-
ments of counsel, and opinions, especially that of Woodbury, J., in the
Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283 (Jan. T., 1849).
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It is the commerce clause of the Federal constitution that con-
fers upon Congress power to regulate commerce "with foreign
nations, and among the several States." It is essential to dearness
of thought on the subject, that we have a definite idea of just
what is commerce, as the word is here used. For reasons that we
shall not pause to elaborate, we submit that it essentially consists
in transportation, that is, of persons or property, between points
in different States, or to or from a point in a foreign country. Al-
though the point is obscured in the confusing and unsatisfactory
definition of commerce that has been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court,10 it seems to have been apprehended by that court in at
least one instance, it being said that "transportation . . . . is
commerce itself." 1
In determining the power of Congress and of the States respec-
tively as to interstate and foreign commerce or transportation, we
submit that it is very helpful to distinguish between what we
venture to term the subject of transportation, that is, what is
transported, be it a person or property, and what we term the
agency of transportation, in particular, the carrier, usually a comn-
mon carrier. The agency of transportation may be regarded as
including, not merely the person engaged in transportation, but
10 "Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly
considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navi-
gation and the transportation of persons and property, as well as the pur-
chase, sale, and exchange of commodities." County of Mobile v. Kimball,
io2 U. S., 69i, 702 (Oct., i88o). This was approvingly quoted in McCall
v. California, 136 U. S., io4 (i8go); Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S., 270
(Igoo); Champion v. Ames, x88 U. S., 32, 351 (1903). See also state-
ment in Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S., 161, 176 (i9o8) which seems to indicate
an increasing confusion of conception. But it is easily demonstrable that,
in the opinion of the Supreme Court, at least, commerce but partially and
imperfectly comprehends intercourse. It suffices to refer to decisions relat-
ing to insurance and other contracts. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., 168
(Dec., x868); Ware v. Mobile County, 209 U. S., 405 (igo8). And it
scarcely seems to need pointing out that commerce does not comprehend
mere traffic as such at all, or "the purchase, sale, and exchange of commo-
dities," these being of themselves merely internal transactions, to which
the power of CongreSs does not extend. See Employers' Liability Cases,
207 U. S., 463, 493 (x98). For instance, in N. Y. ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U. S., 152 (19o7), the commerce clause was held not to apply to a
mere sale of stock. All then that really remains of the definition is that
commerce consists in "the transportation of persons and property" (the
words "and transit" being omitted as superfluous).
"Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S., 465, 470 (Oct., 1877).
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the instrumentalities employed by him; thus, in case of transporta-
tion by railroad, cars, engines, track, stations, &c.
As this distinction seems to us so helpful, we shall endeavor
to make it more clear by illustration. Suppose the entire inter-
state commerce of the country (excluding, for the sake of con-
venience, foreign commerce) to consist in transportation between
Boston and Albany; that is, of clothing from Boston to Albany,
and food from Albany to Boston. Now, it is obvious at the out-
set that there is no necessary connection whatever between mere
interstate transportation of clothing or of food, and their trans-
portation by a carrier, that is, a common carrier. The manufac-
turer of the clothing, or the manufacturer or producer of the food,
miglit conceivably transport it from Boston to Albany, or vice
versa, either on his own back, or the backs of animals owned and
controlled by him, or by barrow, or by wagon. Indeed, such con-
ditions of transportation have been and, in certain communities,
continue to be widely prevalent. Even among us, local pedlers
furnish illustrations.
The absence of any necessary connection between mere trans-
portation, and transportation by a carrier, may, perhaps, be even
more clearly understood, when it is realized that transportation, at
any rate, change of location, of tangible objects, may happen
without the interposition of any human agency, as if animals
ferae naturae should pass from State to State, or if lumber should
float down a navigable stream into another State.
Suppose, now, the State of Massachusetts, or of New York, or
Congress, or other governmental authority, to interfere with
transportation, under these conditions, of clothing or food be-
tween Boston and Albany, to what rule of law may the person
transporting resort for protection? Does it make any essential
difference that the transportation in question is between Massa-
chusetts and New York, instead of being wholly within one or the
other of these States? May he not appeal to a principle that ante-
dates by centuries the commerce clause-indeed, the existence of
our nation and its constitution? That he may, seems reasonably
clear.
In Hoxie v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.,1 2 it was said by Bald-
win, C. J., in a well considered opinion: "The right to engage in
commerce between the States is not a right created by or under the
Constitution of the United States. It existed long before that
1282 Conn., 352, 364 (i9o9).
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Constitution was adopted. It was expressly guaranteed to the
free inhabitants of each State, by the Articles of Confederation,
and impliedly guaranteed by article 4, Sect. 2, Const. U. S., as a
privilege inherent in American citizenship."
The point was not entirely overlooked in Gibbons v. Ogden,13
for it was here said by Marshall, C. J., "In pursuing this inquiry
at the bar, it has been said, that the Constitution does not confer
the right of intercourse between State and State. That right de-
rives its source from those laws whose authority is acknowledged
by civilized man throughout the world. This is true. The Con-
stitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the pow-
er to regulate it." Indeed, seven centuries ago, the following
provision appeared in Magna Charta: "All merchants shall have
safe and secure conduct, to go out of, and to come into England,
and to stay there, and to pass as well by land as by water, for buy-
ing and selling by the ancient and allowed customs, without any
evil tolls."
Let us now consider what was the situation presented, and the
action taken by the court, in Gibbons v. Ogden, that starting point
of so much mischief and confusion. The case was not essentially
different from the simple case already supposed, of transporta-
tion of clothing from Boston to Albany, or of food from Albany
to Boston. That is to say, the transportation was of steamboats
between a point in New Jersey and the City of New York and
the relief sought and allowed was against legislation of the State
of New York, that, if valid, would have had the effect to deprive
of the right to so transport. Notwithstanding that the point in-
volved was obscured by verbose discussion of irrelevant topics, it
was, as we have just seen, not entirely overlooked, though given
insufficient consideration.
Similarly, in Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District,14 what was
sought to be transported was stationery, that is, from a point in
Ohio to a point in Tennessee. The relief sought and obtained
was against the action of the State of Tennessee in prohibiting
such transportation, not, indeed, absolutely, but by way of re-
quiring payment of a license tax as a condition of entering into
a contract that involved such transportation.
229 Wheat., I, 211 (I824). The point was, we submit, given insuffi-
cient consideration, and has been strangely ignored in later decisions. It
was referred to, though in dissenting opinions, in Dooley v. U. S., 183 U.
S., 151, 17o (igoi) ; Lottery Case, 188 U. S., 321, 371 (1903).
34120 U. S., 489 (1887).
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It suffices to refer to these two decisions as typical of a 
large
number in which the Supreme Court has allowed 
relief against
interference by a State with the liberty of transportation 
from
State to State. It may then, we submit, be laid down 
as a general
proposition, that one has the absolute right, as 
against any pro-
hibitive or other restrictive legislation by the States, 
or, for that
matter, by Congress, to engage in interstate commerce; 
that is, to
transport persons or articles (including, to a certain 
extent, the
right to transport or transmit the intangible, as in 
case of tele-
graphic messages) from State to State. Furthermore, 
the com-
merce clause has nothing to do with the matter; that is to say,
such right exists independently of the commerce 
clause.14 a It
scarcely needs adding that this view is radically 
at variance with
repeated declarations of the Supreme Court.
We have said that, as a general proposition, one has 
the abso-
lute right, as against any restrictive legislation by 
the States, to
engage in interstate commerce. To avoid possible 
misapprehen-
sion, it may be well to briefly note the principal 
qualifi-
cations of this proposition; that is, note the conditions 
under
which a State may interfere with such transportation.
To begin with, it may exercise its taxing power; thereby 
tax-
ing property employed in such transportation. "This 
immunity
does not prevent a State from imposing ordinary 
property taxes
upon property having a situs within its territbry and 
employed
in interstate commerce."
-' 5 On the other hand, a State may not
tax property beyond its jurisdiction, thus, if in 
course of trans-
portation into or out of the State. Between these .two 
classes of
cases, there is a border territory in which much confusion 
pre-
vails, involved in the application of the established, 
though, we
submit, unsound doctrine, that a State may not tax 
the privilege
of engaging in such transportation. "No State 
can compel a
party, individual or corporation to pay for the privilege 
of en-
gaging in interstate commerce." 
16
Furthermore, it is established that a State may so interfere 
by
way of exercise of the powers reserved generally 
by the Tenth
Amendment; or, as it is sometimes expressed, by way 
of exercise
of its police powers. Perhaps quarantine laws furnish 
the best
illustration of interference under this head. But with 
what, we
14a If the ancient rule here discussed be insufficient as a basis of such
right, then we submit that such basis is the Fourteenth Amendment.
25 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, i9o U. S., i6o (i9o3).
16 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, supra.
THE PSEUDO-DOCTRINE
submit, is glaring inconsistency, the Supreme Court has .denied
application of this qualification to legislation affecting intoxicating
liquors.
It should also be noted that this fundamental right to engage
in interstate commerce, though inhering in individuals generally,
does not inhere in corporations; that is to say, there is
no right to engage therein as a corporation. The reason is obvi-
ous: there is no right to exist as a corporation. "A corporation
not being, like a natural person, one of the elements of society,
of which government is formed, can only be considered as a
creature of the law." U7 This distinction has, however, been per-
sistently overlooked or ignored by the Supreme Court, with re-
suiting confusion. We are not here specially concerned to con-
sider the source of authority to engage in such commerce as a
corporation. Congress and the States seem to have concurrent
power in this respect, thus to create a corporation to engage in
transportation by.railroad. We merely note in passing that this
seems singularly inconsistent with the alleged doctrine of the
exclusiveness of the power of Congress.
Thus far we have been considering interference with the sub-
ject of transportation, interference with the agency of transporta-
tion not being involved, at least not necessarily. Thus in Rob-
bins v. Shelby Taxing District, for instance, it was interference
with the transportation of stationery, the subject of transportation,
that was under consideration. So far as concerned the action of
the court, it seems to have been a matter of absolute indifference
what was the agency of transportation. It might well have been
the seller himself, employing his own conveyance, or a carrier by
steamboat, or a carrier by railroad. Indeed, there is nothing in
the report of the case to positively indicate what was the agency
of transportation contemplated.
But we come now to deal with an essentially distinct class of
cases, involving interference by a State or other governmental
authority with the agency of transportation.
To revert to our illustration, we have, for the sake of simplicity,
supposed the manufacturer of the clothing and the manufacturer
or producer of food to themselves transport their products, with-
out the intervention of a carrier. But now suppose the entire inter-
state commerce or transportation of the country to consist in trans-
portation of such clothing and food between the points mentioned,
17McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.), 407, 418 (x829).
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by means of trains of freight cars. This involves the interven-
tion of a carrier, in practice, always what is known as a common
carrier. We now suppose action by a State that no longer has any
necessary reference to the subject of transportation; that is, does
not operate by way of interference with interstate transportation
of any particular article. Such action now has particular refer-
ence to the agency of transportation, and has a wide range. It
may, for instance, require the freight cars to be of a certain size
and weight, those in management of the train to have certain
qualifications, the train to be equipped with certain appliances,
the rails to be of a certain weight, the track to be of a certain
width, and so on. Although carriage for another is not neces-
sarily by a common carrier, we may, for present purposes, ignore
the negligible class of cases in which it is not, and proceed on the
assumption that interstate transportation is conducted solely by
common carriers, notably by railroad and vessel.
Broadly stated, then, the question is as to the power of a State
to regulate the conduct and liability of common carriers. That
such power of regulation resides in some governmental authority
is settled beyond doubt, in the Supreme Court at any rate, since
the decision in Munn v. Illinois,'
s where it was declared that
"when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to
public regulation." More recently it has been stated as an "ele-
mentary proposition that railroads from the public nature of the
business by them carried on and the interest which the public
have in their operation are subject, as to their State business, to
State regulation." 29
In determining the power of Congress and of the States, re-
spectively, in this regard, we submit that it is of prime importance
to consider for the benefit of what persons the power of regula-
tion is to be exercised. There seem to be three, and only three,
such classes; that is to say, the classification is exhaustive.
First, there is the distinction between those enjoying the benefit
of transportation, that is, travelers or shippers, and those that are,
for the time being, not such. We express this distinction as be-
tween the public, which, for. present purposes, may be regarded as
those residing or sojourning within the territory affected, and
those enjoying the benefit of transportation.
1894 U. S., 113, 130 (Oct., 1876).
29 Atlantic Coast Line v. N. C. Comm., 2o6 U. S., x, ig (19o7).
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Now, it has never been seriously questioned that it is within the
powers reserved to the States to regulate the conduct and lia-
bility of a carrier for the benefit of what we have called "the
public," particularly as to matters involving health or safety. In
every State there is a considerable mass of legislation of this char-
acter, of unquestionable validity. Good illustrations are require-
ments as to checking the speed of trains, 20 and that a whistle be
blown before reaching a crossing. The list might be indefinitely
extended. It may be regarded as settled law that the commerce
clause furnishes iio objection to such legislation.
Turning, now, however, to those enjoying the benefit of trans-
portation, that is, travelers and shippers generally, we distinguish
between those enjoying the benefit of transportation wholly within
a State, and those enjoying the benefit of transportation within
the scope of the commerce clause, a distinction that will, of course,
be readily apprehended, being illustrated by one person traveling
or shippinig between Albany and Buffalo, and, another traveling
or shipping between Albany and Boston.
As with regulation for the benefit of the public, so it seems be-
yond question that it is within the power of a State to regulate the
conduct and liability of a carrier for the benefit of intrastate
travelers and shippers, a good illustration being the power to regu-
late rates for transportation. It remains to consider whether it is
likewise within such power to legislate directly for the benefit of
interstate travelers and shippers. Although there are at least two
comparatively early decisiong 21 that seem to rest substantially
on the proposition that this is beyond the power of a State, the
course of later decisions suggests that the Supreme Court now
recognizes no definite limitation upon the power of a State to
regulate the conduct and liability of a carrier, even though such
regulation be for the benefit of interstate travelers and shippers.
Perhaps the most conspicuous iistance of this is Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. OhioJ2 where was sustained a
statute requiring trains to stop at certain points, as applicable to
transportation between points outside the State (Chicago and
Buffalo), this being clearly regarded as a provision for the benefit
20 See, for instance, Erb v. Morasch, i77 U. S., 584 (I9oo) ; Southern
Ry. Co. v. King, 2,7 U. S., 524 (i90).2 1 Hall v. DeCuir, 9s U.'S., 485 (1877) ; Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Illinois, I8 U. S., 557 (1886).
22 173 U. S., 285 (i899).
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of interstate passengers. To like effect seems Chicago, Milwau-
kee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan,28 sustaining a statute relating to
exemption from liability; Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v.
R. A. Petterson Co.,24 sustaining a provision as to the obligation
assumed by a carrier accepting for transportation beyond his own
line; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. McCann,
2 5 sustaining
the imposition of liability for negligence of a connecting carrier.
These instances are merely illustrative; others might be cited:
Turning now to a consideration of the power of Congress in
this regard, it is unnecessary to consider what power it has, if
any, to regulate the conduct and liability of a carrier for the
benefit of "the public," or of those enjoying the benefit of trans-
portation wholly within a State. Suffice it to say that such power
is not exclusive. Although Congress unquestionably has power to
regulate such conduct and liability for the benefit .of those en-
joying the benefit of transportation within the scope of the com-
merce clause, we have just seen that the States likewise have such
power without definite limitation.
Hence, the conclusion seems justified that the power of Con-
gress to regulate the conduct and liability of carriers is not ex-
clusive; in other words, the States have concurrent power to reg-
ulate such conduct and liability.
Having, we submit, demonstrated the non-existence of the al-
leged doctrine of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to
regulate commerce, it remainsto point out some of the practical
mischief that has resulted from the supposed existence of this
doctrine. Without attempting anything like an exhaustive analy-
sis of the decisions applicable, we content ourselves with refer-
ring to Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.,
2" and Leisy
& Hardin,27 under the head of State action having reference to
the subject of transportation, and to Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Illinois,28 under the head of such action having reference
to the agency of transportation.
Now, in Bownan v'. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., and in
Leisy & Hardin, it was held beyond the power of a State to inter-
23 69 U. S., 133 (18W).
24 169 U. S., 31T (898).
25 I74 U. S., 580 (I8ft).
26 I25 U. S., 465 (i888).
27 135 U. S., ioo (x8go).
28 1x8 U. S., 557 (1886).
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fere with the transportation of intoxicating liquors between points
in different States; this on the distinct ground that such action
was repugnant to the commerce clause. But suppose that it had
been understood by the court that the commerce clause had noth-
ing to do with the matter; that the principle, if any, that was vio-
lated, antedated and was independent of the commerce clause.
Would it not have been easy for the court to see that liberty of
transportation between whatever points, whether or not both are
within the State, does not include liberty to transport what, in
the judgment of the legislature of the State, endangers the public
morals and the public safety?
Turning now to the other class of cases, that of State action
having reference to the agency of transportation, in Wabash, St.
Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, it was held beyond the power of
a State to regulate charges for interstate transportation; here,
again, on the ground that such action was repugnant to the com-
merce clause. This decision was of momentous practical impor-
tance, in furnishing excuse for the enactment of that mischievous
piece of legislation, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It has
already been pointed out that this decision, as well as Hall v.
De Cuir, which was here applied, is inconsistent with the course
of later decisions of the Supreme Court, according to which there
is no definite limitation upon the power. of a State to regulate the
conduct and liability of a carrier, even though such regulation be
for the benefit of interstate travelers and shippers. But suppose
that the court, in deciding Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, had apprehended what seems now to be the established
doctrine, the Interstate Commerce Act perhaps would not have
been enacted, and the matter of regulation of charges for: inter-
state transportation would have been left where, we submit, it
properly belongs, that is, with the States.
The following may be stated, by way of summary and con-
clusion:
There is a distinction between the subject of transportation, that
is, what is transported, and the agency of transportation, in par-
ticular, a common carrier.
Interference by a State with the subject of transportation, that
is to say, with transportation from State to State, is forbidden, not
by the commerce clause, but either by a rule of law that antedates
and is independent of the commerce clause, or by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or by both, by which one has the right, as against
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any restriction imposed by a State, to transport from State
to State. The power of interference by a State with the agency
of transportation, thus, by way of regulation of the conduct and
liability of a common carrier, is concurrent with that of Congress,
even as to regulation for the benefit of interstate travelers or
shippers.
It follows that the supposed doctrine of the exclusiveness of
the power of Congress to regulate commerce, has (apart from
anomalous cases) nothing more than a nominal existence.
New York City. Frederick H. Cooke.
